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Abstract: In the modern financial architecture, financial services and products 
increasingly are provided outside of the traditional banking system—and thus without the 
need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. Most 
corporate financing, for example, no longer is dependent on bank loans but raised 
through special-purpose entities, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, hedge 
funds, and investment banks. This shift, referred to as “disintermediation” and described 
as creating a “shadow banking” system, is so radically transforming finance that 
regulatory scholars need to rethink their assumptions. Two of the fundamental market 
failures underlying shadow banking—information failure and agency failure—were also 
prevalent in the bank-intermediated financial system. By amplifying systemic risk, 
however, disintermediation greatly increases the importance of what scholars long have 
viewed as a third market-failure category: externalities. Viewing externalities as a 
distinct category of market failure is misleading, though: externalities are fundamentally 
consequences, not causes, of failures; and all market failures can result in externalities. 
Focusing on externalities also obscures who should be responsible for causing the 
externalities. This article argues that the third market-failure category should be 
reconceptualized as a “responsibility failure”: a firm’s ability to externalize a significant 
portion of the costs of taking a risky action. That not only would more precisely describe 
the market failure but also would help to illuminate that sometimes the government itself, 
not merely individual firms, should bear responsibility for causing externalities, and that 
exercising this responsibility may require the government to enact laws that require firms 
to internalize those costs.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The world’s financial architecture is rapidly changing. A central feature of this 
change is disintermediation3—bypassing the need for bank intermediation between the 
sources of funds, essentially the capital and other financial markets,4 and firms that use 
funds to operate in (and thus contribute to) the real economy.5 By bypassing banks, firms 
are able to avoid the profit mark-up that banks charge on their loans.6  
 
 The amount of disintermediated credit already “rivals” the amount of bank-
intermediated credit to households and businesses.7 The trajectory of disintermediation 
suggests that disintermediated credit will soon, if it does not already, exceed bank-
intermediated credit: the gross amount of disintermediated credit was estimated to be 
                                                 
3 In the financial context of this article, all references to “disintermediation” mean 
financial disintermediation.  
4 The term “capital markets” means any market where debt, equity, or other securities are 
or may be bought and sold. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). 
5 The term “disintermediation” is, to some extent, a misnomer because there still may be 
non-bank intermediaries between financial markets and users of funds. Those non-bank 
intermediaries include special-purpose entities and other entities that operate without 
access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees, including finance 
companies, hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, and investment 
banks. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, Inaugural Address, Boston 
University Review of Banking & Financial Law Inaugural Symposium; available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993185.    
6 A bank like any other business needs to make a profit by buying low and selling high. It 
therefore lends money to borrowers at a mark-up over its cost of funds. Cf. Stephen 
Rousseas, A Markup Theory of Bank Loan Rates, 8 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 135, 136 
(1985) (“Banks, like non-bank firms, are in business to make a profit . . . .”). 
7 ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, Abstract 
to SHADOW BANKING (2010).  
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nearly $20 trillion in March 2008,8 but was estimated at three times that level—$60 
trillion—in December 2011.9 A more recent estimate suggests an even higher number.10    
 
 Disintermediation is making it increasingly difficult for scholars, who are 
accustomed to speaking in terms of banks and bank lending, to agree on financial 
regulation.11 Indeed, scholars often say that disintermediation has created a “shadow 
banking” system,12 but they don’t even agree on what that term means.13 Communication 
among scholars is critical, though,14 because regulators and policymakers are informed 
by their research.15   
                                                 
8 Id. at 4-5.  
9 See Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 
20, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-
banking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (indicating that shadow banking is a $60 trillion 
industry). 
10 Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report (Nov. 18, 2012) 
(estimating shadow banking’s worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011). 
11 Cf. U.S. Regulatory Fog, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2012, at 8 (referring to the “persistence 
of regulatory confusion”); Brian Reid, Time to Stamp out Confusion Around “Shadow 
Banking”, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE (arguing that miscommunication is causing 
regulators to misclassify money-market mutual funds as part of the shadow banking 
system), available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/speeches/view_11_mmfs_fsb (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2013); European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, EVCA’s 
Response to the Background Note of the Financial Stability Board on “Shadow Banking: 
Scoping the Issues” (May 23, 2011) (discussing how confusion about shadow banking 
could confuse regulatory approaches), available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c_110901e.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
12 This article does not use the term “shadow banking” with any pejorative implications. 
Cf. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, STRENGTHENING THE OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF 
SHADOW BANKING: PROGRESS REPORT TO G20 MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS (Apr. 16, 
2012), at 1 n. 2 (noting that “the use of the term ‘shadow banking’ is not intended to cast 
a pejorative tone on this system of credit intermediation. The FSB has chosen to use the 
term ‘shadow banking’ as this is most commonly employed and, in particular, has been 
used in the earlier G20 communications. Alternative terms used by some authorities or 
market participants include ‘market-based financing’ or ‘market-based credit 
intermediation.’”). 
13 Even the scope of the term “shadow banking” is unsettled. Regulating Shadow 
Banking, supra note 5. 
14 Communication should be feasible even among scholars in different fields because 
financial regulation has a common goal: optimizing financial markets to enable capital 
formation. FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 3-4 
(2000) (describing the traditional purposes ascribed to financial markets); Jeffrey 
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 This article argues that the primary cause of regulatory confusion is that 
disintermediation has increased the relative importance of one of the fundamental 
categories of financial market failure. Two types of market failures underlying shadow 
banking—information failure and agency failure—were also prevalent in the bank-
intermediated financial system. By amplifying systemic risk, however, disintermediation 
has greatly increased the importance of what scholars long have viewed as a third market-
failure category: externalities.  
 
 That change is critical from a regulatory standpoint. Although an important job of 
regulation is to help internalize externalities, financial regulation, which traditionally was 
concerned with banks, focused mostly on correcting information failure and agency 
failure. To the extent financial regulation addressed bank externalities, it focused mostly 
on bank prudential regulation16 and preventing bank runs.17  
 
 Disintermediation has made that focus inadequate. Prudential regulation does not 
apply, and as a practical matter cannot be applied, to all of the firms that operate as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000) 
(observing that developed financial markets are associated with a better allocation of 
capital). 
15 Cf. Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Defining our Terms Carefully and In Context: 
Thoughts on Reading (And in One Case, Rereading) Three Books, 31 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 695, 695 (2012) (in the context of financial disintermediation, arguing that 
“sloppy language leads to sloppy thinking” and that “any rigorous discussion of the need 
for reform and/or more or less regulation of the mostly private institutions that carry out 
[disintermediated] financial transactions requires that we state clearly what we mean by 
the terms ‘bank,’ ‘shadow bank’ and ‘the shadow banking system’”); GROUP OF THIRTY, 
THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2008) 49, available at 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervis
ion.pdf (identifying the importance of communication between regulators and noting that 
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets facilitated ongoing and fluid 
communication among regulators providing the backdrop for U.S. financial supervisors 
to respond quickly and decisively to the financial crisis). 
16 See infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing prudential regulation). 
17 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing bank runs). 
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shadow banks.18 And those firms are not deposit-taking institutions, so bank runs cannot 
occur.19 Furthermore, this article contends, viewing externalities as a distinct category of 
market failure is itself misleading. Externalities are fundamentally consequences, not 
causes, of failures. It thus is counterintuitive to speak of externalities as a type of cause of 
a market failure. Moreover, even ignoring that conflation of cause and effect, 
externalities cannot constitute a unique category of market failure because all market 
failures can result in externalities.  
 
 Although those errors should be conceptually dispositive, an even worse problem 
results from viewing externalities as a distinct category of market failure: it obscures who 
should be responsible for causing the externalities. This article will show—contrary to 
the traditional paradigm of market failure, which assumes away government action or 
inaction as a cause of failure—that sometimes it is government itself, not individual 
firms, that should bear responsibility for causing externalities. In those cases, good 
financial regulation requires laws that internalize the costs of those externalities.  
 
 This article proceeds as follows. Part II.A examines how regulatory scholars 
traditionally view financial market failures, identifying three categories of failures: 
information failure, agency failure, and, to a more limited extent, externalities. Part II.B 
examines the disintermediated financial system and shadow banking. It shows that 
although information failure and agency failure remain relevant categories of market 
failures, disintermediation makes it much more likely that firms will engage in profitable 
but risky transactions, although doing so could externalize harm onto third parties. 
Externalization of harm is the fundamental source of systemic risk.  
 
 Part II.C of the article argues that although externalization of harm best fits into 
the existing market-failure category of “externalities,” that is a misleading term for a 
                                                 
18 Recall that these firms include special-purpose entities, finance companies, hedge 
funds, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, and investment banks. See supra 
note 5 and accompanying text. 
19 But cf. infra note 127 (discuss how disintermediation has potentiated the equivalent of 
a bank run). 
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market-failure category. Scholars studying financial disintermediation should focus more 
on the cause of those externalities, which can be explained as a type of responsibility 
failure in which a firm externalizes a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky 
action. Part II.C also examines some of the important responsibility failures in the 
disintermediated financial system, including the short-term funding of long-term projects 
and the limited liability of investors who manage firms. Additionally, Part II.C examines 
how the concept of responsibility failure could inform financial regulation. Finally, Part 
III of the article applies the fundamental market-failure categories—information failure, 
agency failure, and responsibility failure—to analyze regulatory provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act that address financial disintermediation.  
 
II. ANALYSIS  
 
 The central purpose of regulation—at least of financial regulation—is correcting 
market failures.20 The analysis therefore begins by examining traditional regulatory 
perspectives and tools, showing how they address financial market failures.21 The article 
demonstrates that those perspectives and tools primarily address two fundamental market 
failures—information failure and agency failure22—and to a more limited extent address 
what scholars long have viewed as a third market failure—externalities.23  
 
 Disintermediation can amplify systemic risk, thereby increasing the potential 
magnitude of—and thus the need for scholars to address—externalities. However, 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE 1990S 
21 (1990). Welfare economists argue that regulation should also include the goal of 
maximizing social welfare. See, e.g., Charles Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: 
Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107, 110–11 (1979). 
21 See Part II.A, infra. 
22 There is some inherent overlap in these categories. An information failure, for 
example, can contribute to an agency failure. See, e.g., Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard, 90 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 383, 384 
(1988) (observing that an agent with more information about its actions may be 
motivated to act inappropriately vis-a-vis the principal). 
23 This article uses the commonplace definition of externalities as negative externalities: 
as uninternalized cost or harm that is imposed on third parties.   
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because “externalities” refers only to a failure’s consequences, not its cause, it is a 
misleading term for a market failure. Scholars could communicate more precisely about 
the disintermediated financial system, the article argues, by speaking in terms of 
“responsibility failure” as a type of market failure that can cause externalities.   
 
 A. Traditional Regulatory Perspectives and Tools 
 We can identify traditional regulatory perspectives and tools by observing the 
scholars most involved in studying financial regulation. Those scholars can be roughly 
divided into three groups: securities law scholars, law-and-economics scholars and 
economists, and banking law scholars. This division is not perfect because scholars often 
engage in overlapping interdisciplinary discourses. For example, law-and-economics 
scholars study securities law and banking law, and scholars in indirectly related areas of 
law, such as bankruptcy and insurance, study financial regulation.24 Furthermore, 
economists study all forms of financial regulation.25 Also, law and economics is, 
technically, a methodology whereas securities law and banking law are subject areas. 
Nonetheless, as shown below, the division is useful because each such group—securities 
law scholars, law-and-economics scholars and economists, and banking law scholars—
has different perspectives and utilizes different tools.   
 
 1. Perspectives and Tools of Securities Law Scholars. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Too Big to Fail - The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial 
Regulation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written testimony of bankruptcy-law 
scholar David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (arguing 
against the special treatment of financial derivatives contracts under the Bankruptcy 
Code); Emerging Issues in Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, Sept. 14, 2011 (written testimony of insurance-law scholar Daniel 
Schwarcz, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota School of Law) (testifying on 
the relationship between insurance and financial regulation).   
25 See Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for 
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 896 (2009) (discussing the 
Geneva Report, a report prepared by a group of economists proposing improvements to 
financial industry regulation). 
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 Securities law scholars traditionally analyze issues from the perspectives of 
asymmetric information and conflicts of interest.26 To reduce information asymmetry, 
they focus on increasing transparency between issuers of, and investors in, securities.27 
They also focus on reducing conflicts of interest between principals (such as owners of a 
firm) and agents (such as managers hired to run the firm) to improve corporate 
governance.28 
 
 Securities law scholars use disclosure of information, by issuers of securities to 
investors in the securities, as the principal tool to increase transparency.29 They also use 
the imposition of fiduciary duties (such as duties owed by brokers and advisers30) and 
                                                 
26 Association of American Law School (AALS), 2013 Annual Meeting, Global 
Engagement and the Legal Academy Final Program, at 12 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://aals.org/am2013/FinalProgram2013.pdf. See also 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN, & 
TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 42 & 286 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the central 
themes in securities law of reducing information asymmetry, through disclosure, and 
reducing the conflicting interests of corporate managers and outside shareholders). Cf. 
Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (2011) (“The risk 
management reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act attempt to address the conflicts of interest 
and incentives that create enterprise and systemic risks through conventional and more 
creative approaches to securities regulation. Several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
emphasize the importance of disclosure as a method for reducing information 
asymmetries.”). 
27 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (arguing that disclosure is the 
principal justification for the federal securities laws). 
28 LOSS, SELIGMAN, & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 286. Cf. Complaint at 2, SEC v. 
Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 3229) 
(focusing on conflicts of interest for large financial conglomerates with different stakes in 
a transaction). 
29 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 27; LOSS, SELIGMAN, & PAREDES, supra note 26, at 
42.  
30 See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (cautioning against the harmonization of fiduciary 
standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers without assessing their respective 
obligations). 
 Regulating Shadows.docx 
9 
improvements in corporate governance (such as aligning executive compensation with 
long-term interests of the firm31) as tools to reduce conflicts of interest. 
 
 These perspectives and tools effectively focus on correcting two categories of 
market failures: information failure and agency failure. Asymmetric information is a form 
of information failure, and disclosure is directed at correcting that failure. Conflicts of 
interest constitute agency failure, the second category, insofar as the conflicts are 
between principals and their agents—such as conflicts between owners and managers of a 
firm,32 or intra-firm conflicts between middle managers and the senior managers to which 
they report.33 Securities law attempts to correct that second category of failure by 
imposing fiduciary duties and improving corporate governance. 
 
 2. Perspectives and Tools of Law-and-Economics Scholars and Economists. 
 Law-and-economics scholars and economists traditionally analyze issues from the 
standpoint of economic efficiency.34 The study of economic efficiency focuses on market 
failures.35 In the context of the financial system, law-and-economics scholars and 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview 
of the Issues, 20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5 (2006) (providing proposals for making 
executive pay, and its relationship to performance, more transparent). Cf. John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (arguing that shifting from cash-based to equity-based executive 
compensation has enhanced the incentive for managers to manipulate earnings). 
32 This is the classic corporate principal-agent conflict. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried supra 
note 31. 
33 Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009). 
34 The concept of economic efficiency, the allocation of resources in an economically 
efficient manner, forms the analytical framework of law-and-economics study. Jules L. 
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512 
(1979). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market 
Transformation, forthcoming SEATTLE U. L. REV. (2012 symposium issue), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041428. 
35 Alan Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 131, 131 (1983) 
(discussing economists’ focus on market failures). Cf. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (defining market failure as “an 
imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient allocation of resources”); IVAN 
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economists identify asymmetric information, a form of information failure, as one of the 
main sources of market failure.36  
 
 Law-and-economics scholars and economists also increasingly take into account 
behavioral psychology as a source of market failure, recognizing that humans are not 
wholly rational actors.37 We have difficulty, for example, appreciating unlikely events 
that, if they occur, could have devastating consequences.38 Thus, in both the Great 
Depression and the recent financial crisis, observers critically under-appreciated the 
systemic consequences of a precipitous drop—unprecedented in then-recent history—in 
collateral value.39  
 
 Such “bounded rationality” can be viewed either as a subset of information failure 
or as a separate type of market failure. It can be viewed as the former because bounded 
rationality results in information failure: people misinterpreting, over-relying, or under-
relying on information.40 It can be viewed as the latter by confining information failure to 
facts (and thus, effectively, confining information failure to asymmetric information 
                                                                                                                                                 
PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 414 (3d ed. 2007) (observing that 
government regulation enhances social welfare by correcting market failures). 
36 A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Definition of “Market Failure,” 
OXFORDREFERENCE.COM, available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e1927 
(last visited June 7, 2012). Economists use market failure as an approach to 
understanding the issue of government intervention. An alternate economic approach, 
following Coase, relies on the concept of transaction costs. See Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & 
Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 558, 
562 (1999) (critiquing the evolution of the market failure concept as a diagnostic tool and 
arguing that externalities are best defined by transaction costs and not as market failures). 
37 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of 
Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, at 821-22 & 825). 
38 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366-68 (2011). 
39 Id. at 1367-68 (observing the parallel between subprime margin loans as a causal 
element of the Great Depression (when the rising stock market collapsed, causing many 
of the loans to become undercollateralized) and subprime real-estate loans as a causal 
element of the recent financial crisis (when the rising housing market collapsed, causing 
many of the loans to become undercollateralized)). 
40 Cf. id. at 821 (acknowledging that “[e]ven in financial markets, humans have bounded 
rationality—a type of information failure . . . .”).  
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problems).41 Bounded rationality would then be a separate type of market failure because 
it can undermine comprehension even if parties have perfect factual information.42  
 
 This article does not purport to definitively resolve whether bounded rationality 
should be viewed as a subset of information failure or as a separate type of market 
failure. For simplicity, the article tentatively views bounded rationality as a subset of 
information failure, recognizing this means that inquiries about information failure 
should focus not merely on information asymmetry but also on behavioral psychology. 
So viewed (and subject to that caveat about the scope of inquiry), information failure 
remains the main source of financial market failure as seen by law-and-economics 
scholars and by economists. 
 
 Law-and-economics scholars also view externalities as another source of market 
failure.43 Likewise, economic theory usually assumes that externalities are a category of 
fundamental market failure.44 The failure is seen as the externalities undermining 
                                                 
41 See e-mail from John Komlos, Professor of Economics, University of Munich, & 
Visiting Professor of Economics, Duke University, to the author (Aug. 25, 2012) 
(proposing that information failure be confined to facts). 
42 Cf. Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 37, at 821 (arguing that even though it can 
be viewed as a type of information failure, bounded rationality may be “distinct and 
important enough to merit a separate category” as a market failure). 
43 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44 (4th ed. 2004) 
(observing that another “source of market failure is the presence of what economists call 
externalities”) (emphasis in original); Brett Fischman, Spillovers Theory and Its 
Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 806 (2009) (“Externalities . . . are 
understood to be an important type of ‘market failure.’”); Antonio Vives, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: The Role of Law and Markets and the Case of Developing 
Countries, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 224 n. 61 (2008) (“Economists normally identify 
four types of market failure [including] externalities.”); Paul H. Brietzke, Urban 
Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 763 (1991) (“The Chicago 
School of law and economics recognizes market failures, including externalities . . . .”). 
44 See, e.g., Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 
351, 363 (1958) (discussing the types of externalities that constitute forms of market 
failure); KARL E. CASE, ECONOMICS AND TAX POLICY 121 (1986) (“A third major market 
imperfection is the existence of external costs . . . .”); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure 
Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 957 (1997) (noting that Pigou viewed 
“externalities as a market failure”) (citing ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 329–335 (4th ed. 1960)). 
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economic efficiency by imposing costs of an activity onto third parties.45 Regulation 
could correct this failure, thereby increasing efficiency, by reallocating those costs onto 
the actor.46 
 
 3. Perspectives and Tools of Banking Law Scholars. 
 Banking law scholars traditionally analyze issues from the perspective of deposit-
taking banks. In that context, they focus on avoiding bank solvency crises and bank 
runs.47 Their tools include the imposition of prudential rules on risk-taking by banks, 
limitations on bank capital ratios, and liquidity protection.48 As shown below, these 
perspectives and tools effectively focus on correcting information failure, agency failure, 
and externalities.  
 
 Prudential rules on risk-taking, for example, often require banks to engage in 
prudent due diligence when extending credit to borrowers, thereby helping to correct 
information failure.49 Prudential regulation also seeks to prevent bank managers from 
taking risks that benefit them more than their banks, thereby helping to correct agency 
failure.50  
 
                                                 
45 Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411–12 (2004). 
46 Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and 
Biodiversity Conversion in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 35 (1996) 
(discussing “Pigouvian” taxes). 
47 See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control 
Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 171 (1986). 
48 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215 (2002) (discussing prudential rules to control risks); David Zaring, A Lack of 
Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97 (2010) (discussing leverage caps for banks); Arthur W. 
Leibold, Jr., Primary and Secondary Liquidity, 26 BUS. LAW. 411 (1970) (discussing 
liquidity). 
49 See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational Intermediation, 1 BUS. L. 
BRIEF (AM. U.) 59, 62–63 (2011–12) (noting Dodd-Frank’s increased due diligence 
requirements for investors); The Monitor, Bank Regulation, 31 NO. 1 BANKING & FIN. 
SERVICES POL’Y REP. 20, 21 (2012) (discussing the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency’s proposed bank guidance for meeting due diligence requirements). 
50 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 48, at 264. 
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 Furthermore, some banking regulation focuses on correcting externalities as a 
market failure. For example, limitations on capital ratios are intended to improve bank 
stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of a collapse that could harm third parties.51 
Also, although economists often say that bank runs are caused by information failures,52 
the regulation most directly aimed at avoiding bank runs is intended to reduce 
externalities. In a bank run, some depositors panic, converging on the bank in a “grab 
race” to withdraw their monies first. Because banks keep only a small fraction of their 
deposits on hand as cash reserves, other depositors may have to join the run in order to 
avoid losing the grab race.53 If there is insufficient cash to pay all withdrawal-demands, 
the bank will default.54 That, in turn, can create externalities by causing other banks or 
their creditors to default.55 The standard regulatory solution, alleviating depositor panic 
by providing government deposit insurance, is intended to reduce the risk of those 
externalities.56 
                                                 
51 Cf. infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
capital and similar requirements); Marianne Ojo, Basel III--The Journey Culminating in 
the Present Framework (Part 1), 30 NO. 9 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 13, 16 
(2011) (“As was highlighted under the introductory section, the promotion of financial 
stability through more risk sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of Basel II’s 
primary objectives.”). 
52 Cf. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 404 (1983) (using the Diamond-Dybvig model to explain 
bank runs as a form of undesirable equilibrium triggered by expectations based on 
incomplete information, in which depositors (sometimes irrationally) expect the bank to 
fail, thereby causing its failure). Information failures arguably are only part of the cause 
of bank runs, however; even if an information failure initiates a run on a bank, depositors 
with perfect information face the collective action problem that they may have to join the 
run in order to avoid losing the grab race. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.  
53 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, 
and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1988) (linking bank 
runs and depositor collective action problems). 
54 R.W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 145 (2005) (observing that a bank’s cash 
reserves are often less than five percent of its deposits). 
55 Chris Mundy, The Nature of Systemic Risk: Trying to Achieve a Definition, BALANCE 
SHEET, Oct. 24, 2004, at 29. 
56 See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit 
Insurance, and Bank Regulation, 59 J. BUS. 55 (1986) (analyzing optimal contracts that 
prevent bank runs and observing that government provision of deposit insurance can 
produce superior contracts). The direct effect of deposit insurance, protecting individual 
depositors, might be argued to be somewhat misguided because depositors are 
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 4. Summary. 
 The traditional perspectives and tools of scholars studying financial regulation are 
focused primarily on correcting two market failures, information failure and agency 
failure, and to a more limited extent are focused on correcting what is viewed as a third 
market failure, externalities.57 This article next argues that the disintermediated financial 
system makes the third market failure much more important. The article also contends 
that the third market failure should more accurately be characterized as a type of 
“responsibility failure”58 rather than as “externalities.” To understand why, it is first 
necessary to understand the disintermediated financial system.  
 
 B. The Disintermediated Financial System 
 The disintermediated financial system, or shadow banking, encompasses 
financing and financial services provided through non-bank entities.59 This includes 
structured finance and securitization, in which financing is indirectly raised by special-
purpose entities (“SPEs”), including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits 
and structured investment vehicles (commonly known as SIVs).60 It also encompasses 
financing and financial services provided by other financial intermediaries that operate 
                                                                                                                                                 
contracting creditors of the bank. The indirect effect, however, is to protect the bank itself 
from a run. 
57 Although there are other traditional market-failure categories (see Zerbe Jr. & 
McCurdy, supra note 36, at 561 (describing these categories)), they do not appear to be 
relevant to financial regulation, much less to regulation of the disintermediated financial 
system. Market failures due to monopolies and other types of non-competitive markets 
are not generally relevant to the disintermediated financial system. Likewise, the public 
goods problem—a form of collective action problem describing the inability of markets 
to provide goods that, like clean air, are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, since some 
parties will want to free ride on public goods when such goods are (inevitably) purchased 
by others—does not appear to be relevant to the disintermediated financial system. 
58 See infra Part II.C.1 (defining responsibility failure as a firm’s ability to externalize a 
significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action). 
59 For a more complete discussion of shadow banking, see Regulating Shadow Banking, 
supra note 5; Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP. No. 559 (Apr. 2012); Erik F. Gerding, “The Shadow 
Banking System and Its Legal Origins,” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 
(Jan. 24, 2012 draft).  
60 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 3. 
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without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees, such as finance 
companies, hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders engaging in repo 
lending, and investment banks.61 
 
 The paramount concern posed by the disintermediated financial system is that it 
“can, if left unregulated, pose systemic risks to the financial system.”62 This makes the 
problem of externalities critically important because systemic collapses are likely to 
cause catastrophic harm to innocent third parties.63 To understand why the 
disintermediated financial system poses systemic risks, first consider information failure 
and agency failure. 
 
 By increasing complexity, disintermediation increases information failure by 
making financial transactions and products more difficult to disclose and understand.64 
Disintermediation also intensifies information failure by increasing decentralization, 
which makes it more difficult for market participants to effectively process information.65 
These increased and intensified information failures make panics more likely: they allow 
risks to accumulate unnoticed and unchecked, causing market participants to panic when 
hidden risks suddenly become apparent.66 Panics, in turn, often serve as a trigger that can 
commence a chain of systemic failures.67  
 
                                                 
61 Id. at 3, 5, 6 & 14. 
62 Id. at 4. See also Klara Bakk-Simon et al., Shadow Banking in the Euro Area, 
European Central Bank Occasional Paper No. 133, at 4 (Apr. 2012) (observing that 
disintermediation is “one of the main sources of financial stability concerns”). 
63 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 207 & 235 (2008) (attempting to 
estimate the costs of a systemic failure of the financial system, which could go beyond 
direct economic costs and include indirect “social costs in the form of widespread 
poverty and unemployment”). 
64 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109.  
65 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 13. 
66 Id. (discussing Dan Awrey’s observations in Complexity, Innovation and the 
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916649). 
67 Systemic Risk, supra note 63, at 214. 
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 Disintermediation can also exacerbate information failure by shifting financing in 
two ways: from firms to markets, and from more formal markets to less formal markets.68 
These shifts not only further increase the likelihood of panics, as explained above69; they 
also increase the potential for systemic risk transmission by increasing the system-wide 
correlation among financial firms and markets.70  
 
 Disintermediation also increases the potential for agency failure, especially the 
intra-firm conflicts between middle managers and the senior managers to which they 
report.71 Middle managers will likely know more than senior managers about the 
complex and highly technical financial products that disintermediation makes available, 
making it harder for senior managers to monitor middle managers72—especially when 
senior managers rely on simplifying heuristics, such as value-at-risk (VaR) models, to 
assess risk on those products.73 This increased potential for agency failure can increase 
systemic risk.74 
 
  Neither information failure nor agency failure explain, however, an even more 
important reason why disintermediation poses systemic risks to the financial system: as 
explained below,75 disintermediation makes it much more likely that market participants 
will engage in profitable but risky transactions, although doing so could externalize harm 
onto third parties. Conceptually, this is the fundamental source of systemic risk: 
 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise 
of Exchange Trading Floors and the Rise of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 & 882-87 
(2008) (describing the displacement of traditional exchange trading and arguing that the 
benefits of formal markets can include greater transparency).  
69 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
70 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 15. 
71 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing that agency failure). 
72 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining why the complexity of 
shadow banking, combined with the technology that enables it, can exacerbate the intra-
firm agency failure).  
73 Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 33, at 463-64. 
74 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 17–18, 20. 
75 See infra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of how disintermediation increases the 
potential for externalities). 
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[S]ystemic risk results from a type of tragedy of the commons in which 
market participants lack sufficient incentive, absent regulation, to limit 
risk-taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to others. Law, 
therefore, has a role in reducing systemic risk.76 
 
Externalizing harm onto third parties best fits into the existing market-failure category of 
“externalities.” This article next contends, however, that externalities is a misleading term 
for a market-failure category. Scholars studying financial disintermediation should focus 
more on the cause of those externalities, which can be explained as a type of 
responsibility failure in which a firm externalizes a significant portion of the costs of 
taking a risky action.  
 
 C. Responsibility Failure and Externalities 
 
 1. Defining Responsibility Failure. 
 Linguistics teaches that language ideally should be intuitively clear and precise.77 
For several reasons, “responsibility failure” is a clearer and more precise term than 
“externalities” to discuss market failures in the disintermediated financial system. 
 
 As indicated, there are currently three terms that describe these market failures: 
(1) “information failure”; (2) “agency failure”; and (3) “externalities.” The first two work 
well because they refer to the causes of their respective failures. Information failure is 
caused by information problems—usually the existence of an information asymmetry. 
Agency failure is caused by problems in a principal-agent relationship. In contrast, 
                                                 
76 Systemic Risk, supra note 63, at 193. See also id. at 206. The reference above to a 
“type” of tragedy of the commons reflects that the analogy is imperfect; there is, 
technically, a tragedy of the commons only insofar as market participants (as opposed to 
non-market participants) suffer from the actions of other market participants. Controlling 
Financial Chaos, supra note 37, at 821 n. 22. 
77 Cf. Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, Introduction: Pragmatics, in MEANING AND 
RELEVANCE 1, 1-3 (2012) (summarizing two widely accepted “foundational ideas” in the 
study of language use: that it is important that a speaker’s meaning be recognized, and 
that, to promote “conversational rationality,” utterances should be informative, truthful, 
relevant, and clear).  
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discussing externalities as a market failure is counterintuitive and imprecise because the 
term “externalities” conflates cause and effect, referring only to a failure’s consequences.    
 
 This article proposes that, when discussing the causes of market failures in the 
disintermediated financial system (if not more broadly), we substitute for “externalities” 
the term “responsibility failure.” The latter refers to responsibility for a firm’s ability to 
externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action—such externalization 
of costs being the most important reason why disintermediation poses systemic risks to 
the financial system.78 Responsibility failure differs from information failure because it 
does not deal with problems of information; and it differs from agency failure because it 
addresses obligations to third parties outside of a principal-agent relationship. As 
explained below, responsibility failure is also different, as well as more precise as a type 
of market failure, than externalities.79  
 
 2. Comparing Responsibility Failure and Externalities. 
 The primary reason to denote “responsibility failure,” rather than “externalities,” 
as a type of market failure is that the former term, as discussed, references causation 
whereas the latter term references consequences.80 Scholars who speak of “externalities” 
as a distinct type of market failure are therefore using language imprecisely. Economists 
often recognize, for example, that a market failure has occurred if the production of 
goods or services results in externalities.81 The cause of the market failure is not 
externalities per se, however; rather, it is the problem with the production of goods and 
                                                 
78 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
79 Responsibility failure also goes beyond the failure of actual markets to internalize 
externalities because some of the externalities can be systemic, affecting the overall 
financial system. See Systemic Risk, supra note 76, at 206; see also Part II.B & II.C.3, 
infra. Characterizing responsibility failure as a market failure thus embraces the financial 
system itself as a “market.” Cf. Systemic Risk, supra note 76, at 207 (observing that 
whereas “[t]raditional financial risk focuses on risks within the financial system,” 
“systemic risk focuses on risks to the financial system”) (emphasis in original). 
80 See Part II.C.1, supra. 
81 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 44, at 351 (defining market failure as “the  failure  of  a  
more  or  less  idealized system  of  price-market institutions  to  sustain  ‘desirable’ 
activities or to  estop  ‘undesirable’ activities”).  
 Regulating Shadows.docx 
19 
services that resulted in the externalities. The externalities merely signal that a market 
failure has occurred. The language imprecision is not differentiating between the cause of 
the market failure and a signal (externalities) that the failure has occurred.82 
 
 There are, however, additional serious problems with discussing externalities as a 
type of market failure. Externalities cannot be considered a truly distinct type of market 
failure because all types of market failures can result in externalities.83 For example, 
information failure can result in externalities to the extent information asymmetries cause 
“nonmonetary effects not taken into account in the decisionmaking process . . . .”84 This 
article has also provided examples from the disintermediated financial system of 
information failure causing externalities.85 To avoid this circularity, some economists 
have even questioned whether “externalities” should denote a separate market-failure 
category.86  
                                                 
82 Cf. Mark Sunshine, How Did Economists Blow It (Part 2)? – They Missed The 
Negative Externalities of America’s Limited Liability Society, SUNSHINE REP. (Sep. 8, 
2009), 
available at http://www.thesunshinereport.net/marksunshine/?p=402 (arguing that 
although economic “theories about efficient markets and logical behavior are pretty good, 
the fundamental application of these theories stinks”). 
83 Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 36, at 561. Although there also is some overlap 
between the information failure and agency failure categories (see supra note 22, 
observing that information failure can contribute to an agency failure), that overlap 
concerns causes of failures. The overlap with externalities concerns cause and effect: that 
all causes of market failures can result in externalities. Cf. ANDREAS PAPANDREOU, 
EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 167–69 (1994) (“If externality is simply another word 
for market failure, or institutional failure . . . the notion of externality becomes 
redundant.”).   
84 Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 36, at 561. 
85 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (observing that disintermediation can 
exacerbate information failure, making it more likely that panics will trigger a chain of 
systemic failures and increasing the system-wide correlation among financial firms and 
markets, thereby increasing the potential for systemic risk transmission). 
86 See, e.g., PAPANDREOU, supra note 83, at 99–100 (arguing that the “non-existence of 
markets” is the actual market failure referred to as “externalities” and that it is “not useful 
to treat externalities as a subset of market failure, nor for that matter as a cause of market 
failure”); Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 36, at 562 (arguing that externalities should 
not be defined as market failures). Cf. id. at 564 (arguing that “a close examination of the 
market failure concept gives rise to all sorts of definitional problems” related to 
externalities). 
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 Another problem with discussing externalities as a type of market failure is that 
shifting the attention to consequences can obscure what caused the externalities. Consider 
a firm that takes a risky action because it can externalize a significant portion of the costs. 
Focusing on externalities, one may well conclude that the firm itself should be considered 
solely responsible for causing the externalities. Focusing on responsibility failure, in 
contrast, would help shift attention back to causation, as illustrated by the following 
example.  
 
 Because the managers of most firms have obligations under existing law solely to 
the firms’ shareholders,87 firms that engage in risky projects in order to increase 
opportunities for shareholders to profit may be acting responsibly as defined, indeed 
mandated, by law—even if the effect is to externalize costs. In those cases, the 
government could be viewed as causing the responsibility failure by failing to impose 
laws that limit the ability of firms to externalize those costs.88 This sharpened focus on 
causation is important because the traditional paradigm of market failure assumes away 
government action (or inaction) as a cause of failure.89 
 
 The term “responsibility failure” thus can help (i) to describe the flaws of the 
disintermediated financial system more intuitively and precisely than the term 
“externalities”; (ii) to avoid the confusion that arises by discussing externalities, which 
conflates cause and effect and creates circularity with other market-failure categories, as 
a separate market-failure category; and (iii) to sharpen the focus on who should be 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management 
Relation: Or, What’s so Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994) 
(discussing the duty of managers to shareholders). 
88 Arguably, the government should be so viewed because it is the only entity that, under 
that scenario, can avert the systemic costs. Cf. PAPANDREOU, supra note 83, at 156–58 
(arguing that the cause of inefficiency is the failure of institutions to “reshap[e] the 
boundaries of agents’ actions”).  
89 See Wolf, supra note 20, at 112. Cf. Zerbe Jr. & McCurdy, supra note 36, at 571 
(observing that certain “markets are inefficient not because of any inherent ‘failures,’ but 
because the government has neglected to provide the appropriate institutional 
framework”).  
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responsible for causing the externalities. Scholars—especially legal scholars, who strive 
to be precise with language90—should want to use this more precise term.91  
 
 Using this more precise term, “responsibility failure,” should not constitute a 
break from scholarly precedent. Specific causes of externalities are sometimes 
customarily known by terms that more precisely define those causes. The term “moral 
hazard,” for example, more precisely defines a specific cause of externalities: conditions 
or circumstances that protect a party from the consequences of risky behavior (such as 
insurance or the granting of legal immunity),92 thereby motivating the party to engage in 
such behavior.93 Responsibility failure likewise is a term that more precisely defines a 
specific cause of externalities.  
 
 There is in fact a relationship between the terms responsibility failure and moral 
hazard: the latter is a subset of the former. Responsibility failure denotes risky actions 
taken by a firm because it can externalize a significant portion of its costs, regardless of 
                                                 
90 Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012) 
(discussing why precise definitions of financial concepts—in this case, securitization—
are important for legal regulation). 
91 Ultimately, of course, what constitutes a market failure is largely a matter of definition. 
Cf. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 951, 969 (1997) (observing that “[f]ew economists realize or admit that market 
failures . . . are literally matters of definition”). Even scholars who prefer to continue 
viewing externalities traditionally, as a separate market-failure category, should heed this 
article’s central point: that any study of disintermediation must inquire into the causes of 
those externalities. 
92 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2011 Compact ed.) (Stephen Michael Sheppard, ed.) 
(defining moral hazard). Moral hazard, unlike responsibility failure generally, 
contemplates that the party engaging in risky behavior be specifically protected from its 
consequences.    
93 See Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A 
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 84 (1986) 
(relying on the economic definition of moral hazard: debtors and creditors that are 
protected from the consequences of default “could be expected to increase both excessive 
borrowing and excessive resort to bankruptcy”).  
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the reason why the firm can externalize the costs.94 Moral hazard, in contrast, is defined 
by very particular reasons why a party can externalize costs—conditions or 
circumstances, such as insurance or the granting of legal immunity, that protect the party 
from the consequences of its risky behavior.95 Conceptually, therefore, moral hazard is a 
subset of responsibility failure. 
 
 Responsibility failure can also help to explain the nature and fragility of the 
disintermediated financial system. Part II.C.3 below discusses two such examples: (i) a 
firm profiting by issuing short-term debt to fund long-term projects, thereby taking a 
liquidity risk which could cause systemic and other consequences if the firm defaults on 
repaying its maturing short-term debt; and (ii) the limited liability of investors who 
manage a firm, making it more likely that they will cause the firm to take outsized risks, 
hoping for outsized gains.      
 
 3. Responsibility Failures in the Disintermediated Financial System. 
 (i) ISSUING SHORT-TERM DEBT TO FUND LONG-TERM PROJECTS: A significant and 
widespread responsibility failure in the disintermediated financial system is the short-
term funding of long-term projects.96 ABCP conduits97 and SIVs98 routinely issue short-
                                                 
94 See supra Part II.C.1. Responsibility failure, for example, includes matters like short-
term funding of long-term projects that are unrelated to moral hazard but nevertheless 
allow firms to externalize costs. 
95 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
96 See, e.g., Kyle Glazier, Bernanke: Financial Crisis Was a Structural Failure, BOND 
BUYER, Apr. 16, 2012, at 2 (quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke as 
saying that “a key vulnerability of the [disintermediated financial] system was the heavy 
reliance . . . on various forms of short-term wholesale funding”); Viral V. Acharya & S. 
Viswanathan, Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity, 66 J. FIN. 99, 103 (2011) 
(observing that short-term funding of long-term projects “played an important role in the 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 and the period preceding it”). Cf. Morgan Ricks, Visiting 
Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School, Presentation at the Boston University Review 
of Banking and Financial Law Symposium on Shadow Banking (Feb. 24, 2012) (notes on 
file with author) (arguing that the instability of short-term “money-like” securities is the 
central problem for regulatory policy in the disintermediated financial system); Martin H. 
Wolfson, Minsky’s Theory of Financial Crisis in a Global Context, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 
393, 394 (June 2002) (describing Minsky’s theory that market fragility grows as debt 
levels rise and that the proportion of debt will increase as firms use short-term debt to 
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term commercial paper, for example, to fund long-term projects (usually by funding long-
term loans or investing in financial assets having long-term maturities).99 Money-market 
mutual funds100 also provide short-term loans, essentially withdrawable on demand, to 
fund long-term projects.101 And repo lending by securities lenders102 is almost always 
short term.103 The driving force behind much of the short-term funding of long-term 
projects is the reality that the interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than that on 
long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess an obligor’s ability 
to repay in the short term than in the long term.104  
 
 Short-term funding of long-term projects can be efficient so long as the firm 
issuing the short-term debt will be able to “roll over” that debt (i.e., repay its maturing 
short-term debt from the proceeds of newly borrowed short-term debt), if needed. The 
traditional business of banking, for example, is to borrow on a short-term basis from 
depositors and use the proceeds to make long-term loans to bank customers.105 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
fund long-term financial assets). Economists sometimes refer to the short-term funding of 
long-term projects as a form of maturity transformation or as an asset-liability mismatch. 
See, e.g., Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of 
Intervention, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1588, 1590 (2009). 
97 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
98 See id. 
99 The business model of ABCP conduits and SIVs is very similar to that of banks in that 
they borrow short-term and lend long-term. See, e.g., Structured Investment Vehicle 
Definition, MONEYTERMS.CO.UK, http://moneyterms.co.uk/siv/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
100 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
101 Bryan J. Noeth, et al., Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 2011 at 8-9. 
102 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
103 Cf. infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (discussing how short-term repo 
lending increased systemic risk). 
104 Short-term interest rates may also be lower than long-term rates because the term 
structure of interest rates (also known as the yield curve) is usually increasing despite the 
fact that it represents the risk-free rate for various horizons. E-mail from Simon Gervais, 
Associate Professor of Finance, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, to the 
author (Apr. 14, 2012). 
105 Cf. Part II.C.4 infra (explaining how bank runs, resulting from this short-term 
borrowing to make long-term loans, are related to responsibility failures). 
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 The problem, however, is that a bank or any other firm issuing the short-term debt 
takes an inherent liquidity risk on whether it will be able to roll over that debt.106 If the 
firm becomes unable to roll over the debt, the firm may have to default, which could 
trigger a broader, systemic collapse.107 The result is a responsibility failure: a firm that 
profits by issuing short-term debt might intentionally want to take such a liquidity risk, 
even if it has perfect information about the risk, because much of the harm of a systemic 
collapse would be externalized.108    
 
 The reality can be catastrophic. Economists Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick 
have argued, for example, that securities lenders engaging in short-term repo lending109 
have vastly increased systemic risk.110 The “epicenter” of the recent financial crisis, they 
also contend, was the precipitous decline in value of mortgage-backed securities used as 
collateral for short-term repo loans which prompted repo lenders to demand additional 
collateral.111 These demands forced repo-borrowers to sell assets to generate the 
additional collateral.112 These forced asset sales further depressed asset prices, creating a 
                                                 
106 If investors in the short-term funding fully understand the rollover risk, they may 
demand that it be priced into the firm’s cost—e.g., charging the firm an incrementally 
higher interest rate, or conditioning their funding on the firm purchasing a liquidity 
facility (which would facilitate the rollover if the firm is unable to do so). Because of 
asymmetric information between the firm and its investors, however, the investors may 
not fully understand that risk. 
107 A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market Transformation, supra note 34, at 19-
20. Cf. supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the systemic consequences of a 
bank being unable to pay its short-term obligations to depositors). 
108 Cf. Systemic Risk, supra note 76, at 206 (observing that a market participant may well 
decide to engage in a profitable but risky transaction even though doing so could increase 
systemic risk, since much of the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be 
externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by 
an economic collapse). 
109 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
110 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, at 1 (2010), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947.  
111 Id. at 15. Cf. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on 
Repo, 2012 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 23 (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that these demands were 
caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of different borrowers to the flagging real 
estate market and the value of borrowers’ collateral in the event of defaults). 
112 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 110, at 15.   
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shock that spread rapidly through the interconnected financial system.113 Similarly, 
Federal Reserve Board economists have claimed that the inability of many ABCP 
conduits to roll over their short-term commercial paper in the last five months of 2007 
“played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-
related assets into a global financial crisis.”114 The European Central Bank also has 
identified short-term funding of long-term projects as “a major amplification mechanism 
in situations of stress,” which can particularly “foster systemic risks . . . if [it] takes place 
outside the regulated [financial] system.”115 
 
 (ii) THE LIMITED LIABILITY OF INVESTORS WHO MANAGE FIRMS: The limited 
liability of investors who manage firms in the disintermediated financial system is 
another important source of responsibility failure that can lead to externalities.116 Limited 
liability means that investors in firms are not financially responsible for liabilities of their 
firms.117 As a result, the interests of investors may conflict with the interests of their 
firms and, more importantly for externalities, with the interests of third parties harmed by 
                                                 
113 Id. at 15-16 (observing that SIVs relied on short-term debt to finance purchases of 
asset-backed securities and that money-market mutual funds were forced to liquidate 
assets to repay panicked investors who redeemed their shares). I have made similar 
arguments in Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
232-33 (2009/2010) (discussing information uncertainty through the example of mark-to-
market accounting and margin calls by broker-dealers). Cf. Dan Awrey 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916649) (arguing that by 
increasing decentralization, disintermediation creates market fragmentation, 
interconnectedness, and opacity, making financial markets especially susceptible to 
endogenous shocks, such as panics). 
114 Daniel Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: 
Panic in the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market, Fed. Reserve Bd. Finance and 
Discussion Series, #2009‐36 (2009), at 16, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf. 
115 Klara Bakk-Simon et al., supra note 62, at 24. 
116 Cf. See Edouard Challe, Benoit Mojon, & Xavier Ragot, Equilibrium Risk Shifting and 
Interest Rate in an Opaque Financial System, Ecole Polytechnique, Centre National De 
La Recherche Scientific (September 2012), at 6, available at http://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/72/89/28/PDF/2012-19.pdf (noting that systemic risk arises partially 
because limited liability increases intermediaries’ risk tolerance). 
117 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (3d Pocket ed. 2006) (defining limited 
liability as the “liability of a company's owners for nothing more than the capital they 
have invested in the business”). 
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their firms: even if a firm ultimately becomes liable for the externalized harm, the 
limited-liability investors will not become liable.118  
 
 By facilitating decentralization, disintermediation makes this form of 
responsibility failure much more likely. The relatively small firms, including hedge 
funds, that operate in the disintermediated financial system are often managed directly by 
their primary investors.119 Because such investor-managers typically divide up a 
significant share of the firm’s profits,120 they have strong incentives to take risks that 
could generate large profits. Some risks might even potentially generate such outsized 
profits that investor-managers would gain lifetime financial security.121 Yet if a risky 
action exposes their firm to significant liability for externalized harm, investor-managers 
would not be liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. 
 
 This is radically unlike the management incentives in traditional banking, in 
which the senior managers tend to share only indirectly in profits, such as through stock 
                                                 
118 This is not an overlap with agency failure. Agency failure goes to a principal-agent 
relationship. Conflicts resulting from investor-manager limited liability do not involve 
principals and their agents; they go instead to a conflict between such investors-managers 
and society. 
119 See Richard H. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 4 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 231, 236 (2009) (noting that managers of small banks and thrifts can own 
a large share of their firms’ equity); Stacy Preston Collins, Valuation of Hedge Fund 
Businesses, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 389, 397 (2008) (noting that hedge fund 
managers often have to commit a significant amount of their own capital). 
120 See, e.g., Economic Analysis of the Split of Profits Between Hedge Fund Investors and 
Hedge Fund Management by Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, at 6, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxadministration/18474849.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) 
(noting that, during the period 1998 to 2002, hedge fund managers generally received 
around 20% of their funds’ profits); see also, Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund 
Managers, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 288 (2008) (noting that hedge fund managers 
often receive twenty percent of the funds’ performance that exceeds a minimum 
“performance floor”). 
121 Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S. C. L. REV. 
549, 562-63 (2009) (discussing how “super-large compensation” can skew incentives).  
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options. Most bank profits ordinarily are paid to shareholders.122 Furthermore, bank 
managers are often invested in maintaining their jobs.123 They therefore are much less 
motivated to take actions that risk the firm, such as exposing the firm to significant 
liability for externalized harm. By shifting management incentives, however, 
disintermediation encourages responsibility failure and its resulting externalities.   
 
 The foregoing examples illustrate how the concept of responsibility failure can 
help to inform an understanding of the disintermediated financial system. Responsibility 
failure can also help to inform an understanding of traditional banking, as discussed 
below.  
 
 4. Responsibility Failure and Traditional Banking. 
 The principal concern in traditional banking is the threat of bank runs.124 
Although bank runs are triggered by an information failure,125 their root cause is that 
banks borrow short-term by taking deposits and use the proceeds to make long-term 
loans.126 That creates the potential for one of the types of responsibility failure associated 
with the disintermediated financial system.127 Banks historically have presented much 
less of a risk of responsibility failure than non-banks, however, because banks, unlike (at 
least until recently) most non-banks, have long been substantively regulated to maintain 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the 
Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: 2009, 
1753 PLI/Corp 319, 379 (2009) (describing how Basel III might reduce long-term bank 
stock-dividend payout ratios from sixty percent, pre-crash, to forty percent); Robert 
Boldin & Keith Leggett, Bank Dividend Policy as a Signal of Bank Quality, 4 FINAN. 
SERVICES REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that industry-wide bank payout ratios on stock have 
reached eighty percent). 
123 Cf. Claire A Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (2002) 
(describing how managers who do not own a substantial portion of the firm may be better 
agents for lenders’ interests because of “managers’ desire to keep their jobs, which 
depends on the firm’s continuing financial viability”). 
124 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
125 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.  
126 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
127 See Part II.C.3(i), supra. Gorton and Metrick themselves recognize that the demands 
made on securities lenders engaging in repo lending (see supra notes 109-112 and 
accompanying text) approximated bank runs. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 110, at 15. 
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certain levels of financial responsibility.128 Moreover, government regulation has, for 
many years, mitigated the consequences of responsibility failure: banks generally have 
access to central bank liquidity, ensuring they can pay their debts129; and, at least in the 
United States, the claims of bank depositors are government insured, reducing the 
likelihood of bank runs.130   
 
 The very fact that bank responsibility failure and its consequences have been so 
limited helps to explain why scholars studying financial regulation do not normally focus 
on the concept of responsibility failure: they have not needed to do so. With 
disintermediation, however, all that has changed. Moreover, whether or not caused by 
disintermediation, the increasingly worrisome problem of large banks becoming “too big 
to fail” can also be explained as a form of responsibility failure.131  
 
 5. Summarizing How the Concept of Responsibility Failure Could Inform 
Financial Regulation. 
 The analysis so far has shown that three market failures—information failure, 
agency failure, and responsibility failure—underlie the disintermediated financial 
system.132 Information failure is caused by asymmetric information and lack of 
                                                 
128 Systemic Risk, supra note 63, at 210. 
129 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra Part III.C. 
132 I derived these market failures by examining the tools and perspectives of scholars 
studying regulation of the financial system and then analyzing how disintermediation has 
changed the system. As a reality check, I thereafter compared how these market failures 
correlate with a separate conceptual framework that I independently derived to 
normatively analyze financial regulation. That conceptual framework is based on four 
market failures that could impair efficiency—information failure (due to complexity), 
rationality failure (due to human bounded rationality), principal-agent failure, and 
incentive failure—as well as a type of tragedy of the commons in which individual 
market actors have incentives to engage in systemically risky activities because they 
individually can profit while externalizing some of the cost. See Controlling Financial 
Chaos, supra note 37 (explaining these market failures). The market failures discussed in 
this article appear to correlate well to that conceptual framework: information failure in 
this article correlates to information failure and rationality failure in that framework; 
agency failure in this article correlates to principal-agent failure in that framework; and 
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transparency, as well as bounded rationality. Agency failure is caused by conflicts 
between principals and their agents. Responsibility failure is caused by a firm’s ability to 
externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action. Part III of this article 
next applies these market failures to the Dodd-Frank Act, showing how they can help to 
explain and analyze its provisions.  
 
 Before doing that, however, it may be helpful to summarize how the concept of 
responsibility failure can generally inform financial regulation.133 First, as discussed,134 
the fact that a firm takes a risky action because it is able to externalize a significant 
portion of the costs does not necessarily mean that the firm itself should be considered 
the sole responsible party. By engaging in risky projects, firms may be acting as 
mandated by law on behalf of their shareholders, even if the effect is to externalize costs. 
The government should have a responsibility to consider changing the law, as may be 
appropriate, to limit the ability of firms to externalize those costs or to modify the 
governance standards.135 Similarly, the fact that investors who manage firms in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility failure in this article correlates to incentive failure and the type of tragedy 
of the commons in that framework.   
133 In a recent speech at American University’s Washington College of Law, I also 
discussed how the concept of responsibility failure could help to inform how 
transactional lawyers should address the potential systemic consequences of their client’s 
actions. See Keynote Address—Lawyers in the Shadows: The Transactional Lawyer in a 
World of Shadow Banking, forthcoming ______ (2013). 
134 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
135 Possible regulatory approaches might, for example, include the following: expanding 
oversight liability of directors who take inappropriate business risks (as advocated by 
Robert T. Miller in Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial 
Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2010)); imposing liability on shareholders to 
increase self-monitoring and reduce moral hazard (as advocated by Peter Conti-Brown in 
Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 414, 446 (2012)); de-limiting 
limited liability for investment firms, as advocated by Conti-Brown, id. (arguing that the 
successful operation of investment banks as partnerships until late in the 20th century 
suggests that limited liability may not be needed), and as further advocated by Patrick M. 
Wilson in Protecting Investors from their Investments: Encouraging States to Make 
Assets in Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Available to Creditors Who Have Successfully 
Pierced the Corporate Veil, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 791, 795 (2010) (urging states with 
domestic asset protection trust laws for corporate officers to “allow access to those trust 
assets to satisfy victims' judgments against corporate officers when said victims have 
successfully pierced the corporate veil and demonstrated the irresponsible, if not illegal, 
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disintermediated financial system take outsized risks because limited liability protects 
them from responsibility for losses136 does not necessarily mean that such investor-
managers should be considered the sole responsible parties. The government should also 
have a responsibility to consider modifying limited liability, in order to produce more 
socially optimal firm governance.137  
 
 Second, this article does not suggest that all potential externalities should 
necessarily be internalized. Law generally does not require that all externalities be 
internalized.138 At the very least, though, government should consider requiring systemic 
externalities to be internalized because they are the externalities most likely to cause 
widespread and serious harm.139 By cutting across markets, systemic externalities are 
also the externalities most likely to undermine the ability of multiple markets to maintain 
accurate and transparent pricing.140   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
behavior of corporate officers”). There are, of course, counter-arguments to these types of 
regulatory approaches, such as the extent to which they might, for example, undermine 
the business judgment rule and the policies behind the rule (such as keeping courts from 
judging business decisions through hindsight-biased lenses, and allowing managers and 
directors to take the risks necessary for maximizing shareholder value). See, e.g., In re 
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123–24 (Del.Ch. 2009); Wulf A. 
Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on 
Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1433, 1440–41, 1449 & n. 56 (2010). 
136 See supra Part II.C.3(ii) (discussing limited liability). 
137 Cf. infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing how the Dodd-Frank Act 
addresses limited liability). 
138 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20 (1993) 
(asking what types of externalities the law should require to be internalized).  
139 Systemic Risk, supra note 76, at 206. 
140 Cf. supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
asset prices and systemic collapse in an interconnected financial system). Because 
efficiency is often viewed as meaning that prices fully reflect available information (see, 
e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (noting that an efficient market is one in which prices always 
“fully reflect” available information)), pricing is sometimes seen as an important proxy 
for efficiency. Cf. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Disclosure Decisions by 
Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency, 44 J. FIN. 633 (1989) (noting that more 
efficient securities pricing can lead to more efficient investment decisions). 
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 Third, because banks historically have presented much less of a risk of 
responsibility failure than non-banks, even though both engage in the short-term funding 
of long-term projects,141 government should consider the extent to which banking-like 
regulation could reduce that risk for (at least) systemically important non-banks. For 
example, perhaps those non-banks should be required to maintain minimum levels of 
financial responsibility.142 Similarly, because banking-like regulation has also mitigated 
the consequences of bank responsibility failure, government should consider the extent to 
which such regulation could mitigate the consequences of non-bank responsibility failure. 
Perhaps systemically important non-banks should have access, for example, to central 
bank liquidity.143  
 
 Government insurance of bank deposits144 might also help inform financial 
regulation of non-banks. Although non-banks do not take deposits, there may be a close 
regulatory correlation insofar as the obligation of banks to pay the government to provide 
that insurance internalizes the cost.145 A similar approach, such as requiring banks and 
systemically important non-banks to pay for a systemic risk protection fund, could 
address responsibility failure by motivating “those firms to monitor each other and help 
control each other’s risky behavior.”146 It also could help to internalize the most harmful 
externalities of the disintermediated financial system.147   
                                                 
141 See Part II.C.4, supra. 
142 Cf. infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
requirement that systemically important non-banks be subject to a range of capital and 
other requirements).  
143 Cf. infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
limiting the power of the Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or 
insolvent financial firms). 
144 See supra notes 58 & 130 and accompanying text. 
145 In the United States, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assesses 
risk-based premiums on its member banks. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Capital Groups and 
Supervisory Groups, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/rrps_ovr.html. See also 
12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (discussing FDIC assessments). 
146 Cf. Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 37, at 831. See also id. at 829-33 
(generally discussing how a privatized systemic risk fund could help stabilize 
systemically important firms and markets). 
147 Id. Although various other commentators have also proposed systemic risk taxes (see, 
e.g., Viral Acharya, et al., A Tax on Systemic Risk 3–4 (Ctr. For Economic Policy 
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III. APPLICATIONS 
 
 This Part applies information failure, agency failure, and responsibility failure to 
regulatory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act148 that address financial disintermediation. 
This application demonstrates how these market failures can be used to discuss, and even 
to explain and analyze, shadow banking and its regulation.149  
 
 A. Requiring Sellers in Securitization Transactions to Retain Unhedged Risk 
 
 Securitization is a significant component of the disintermediated financial 
system.150 The Dodd-Frank Act requires sellers of securitization products to retain a 
minimum unhedged position in each class of securities they sell—the so-called “skin in 
the game.”151 This requirement goes to correcting information failure. Congress believed 
that securitization’s originate-to-distribute model, under which the originators of loans 
and other financial assets being securitized sell those assets to special-purpose entities, 
creates information asymmetry between those originators and investors in the special-
purpose entities.152 By retaining unhedged risk, the sellers’ interests should become better 
aligned with the investors’ interests, and thus investors should effectively benefit from 
the sellers’ better information.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Research, Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1741/papers/Acharya.pdf), valuing and administering 
the tax could be difficult. See, e.g., Douglas O. Edwards, (Systemic) Risk and Taxation, 
31 VA. TAX REV. 331, 338 (2011). 
148 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 
(2010) (hereinafter, “Dodd-Frank Act”). 
149 Because this article is primarily concerned with communication among scholars, it 
does not purport to critique the substantive merits of those regulatory provisions. For a 
critique of the substantive merits of certain of those regulatory provisions, see 
Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 37. 
150 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
151 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 941(b), § 15G (directing the SEC to require sponsors of asset-
backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the underlying assets). 
152 See RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, 
at 36 (2010). 
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 Albeit indirectly, this requirement also goes to correcting responsibility failure by 
addressing the short-term funding of long-term projects.153 Special-purpose entities that 
engage in securitization, such as ABCP conduits and SIVs, are significant issuers of 
short-term debt to fund long-term projects.154 The retention of unhedged risk should help 
motivate sellers of financial assets to these entities to monitor that such entities are, and 
will continue to be, able to roll over their short-term debt.   
 
 This example also illustrates the utility of speaking in terms of responsibility 
failure, rather than externalities, as a type of market failure. Responsibility failure helps 
to focus attention on the importance of seller monitoring, which is intended to prevent 
harm (i.e., externalities) that would result from an inability to roll over the short-term 
debt. Speaking in terms of externalities as a type of market failure could obscure that 
focus because externalities are a consequence, not a cause, of the inability to roll over 
short-term debt.        
 
          B. Compensating Senior Managers on a More Long-Term Basis 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act requires senior managers of systemically significant firms to 
be paid on a more long-term basis. To the extent this requirement more closely aligns 
managerial interests with the interests of owners (shareholders) of firms, it goes to 
correcting agency failure.  
                                                 
153 See supra Part II.C.3(i). More direct ways of correcting responsibility failure resulting 
from short-term funding of long-term projects might include better standards on match-
funding coverage, better internal controls on collateral valuation and margining policies, 
and internalizing externalities (such as mandating privately funded systemic risk funds). 
The international Basel III capital accord takes a match-funding coverage approach, for 
example, introducing a liquidity coverage requirement that banks hold sufficient high-
quality liquid assets to cover their total net cash outflows over 30 days and another 
requirement that banks maintain minimum yearly available amounts of stable funding. 
Jerome Walker, Rosali Pretorius, Michael Zolandz, & Gary Goldburg, Reconciling the 
Dodd-Frank and Basel Committee Capital Requirements, 129 BANKING L.J. 627, 631 
(July/August 2012). See, e.g., A Framework for Analyzing Financial Market 
Transformation, supra note 34, at 22; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
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 Requiring senior managers to be paid on a long-term basis should also help to 
correct responsibility failure by minimizing the incentive of managers to externalize costs 
onto society. In the long-term, the interests of managers and a firm’s broader 
stakeholders—like employees, consumers, suppliers, and members of the general 
public—are usually more closely aligned.155 Moreover, requiring senior managers to be 
paid on a long-term basis should help, at least theoretically, to reduce the deleterious 
effects of limited liability156 by making it less likely that managers will take outsized 
risks with their firms that would limit their ability, if the firm fails, to receive the 
remainder of their compensation.  
 
 Focusing on information failure, agency failure, and responsibility failure as 
market-failure categories can also help to articulate and illuminate connections between 
regulatory goals. For example, because managers are generally more risk averse than 
shareholders,157 aligning managerial (agent) interests with shareholder (principal) 
interests can make managers more risk prone; and a firm that takes more risks is more 
likely to fail and trigger externalities. Thus, counter-intuitively, correcting agency failure 
can sometimes exacerbate responsibility failure.   
 
          C. Too Big to Fail 
 
                                                 
155 Cf. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship 
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 
1466–67 (1993). 
156 See supra Part II.C.3(ii). 
157 Cf. Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay 
in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 727 (2011) 
(observing, although questioning, the traditional belief that, absent incentive 
compensation, managers are less risk seeking than shareholders); Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, 
Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 320 
(1990) (“The manager cannot take as cavalier an attitude toward the diversifiable risks of 
his corporation as the stockholder can. If a corporation does badly because a new 
investment project fails, a manager must rely primarily on other projects undertaken by 
the same corporation to balance against it. His salary and prospects and his value to a 
potential new employer would be hurt by poor firm performance.”). 
 Regulating Shadows.docx 
35 
 The Dodd-Frank Act’s limitation on the power of the Federal Reserve to make 
emergency loans to individual or insolvent financial firms158 goes directly to 
responsibility failure. Politicians and regulators worry that the recent increase in size and 
concentration of financial firms159 tempts firms that believe they are too big to fail to 
engage in irresponsible behavior, such as making risky investments to try to gain profits, 
expecting to be bailed out (through emergency loans) if they misjudge the risk.160 Dodd-
Frank’s limitation on emergency lending is intended to remove that temptation, 
motivating financial firms to operate responsibly.161 Its goal is to make financial firms 
less likely to fail, and less likely to externalize costs onto taxpayers if they do fail.162 
 
 Dodd-Frank’s limitation on emergency lending can also be viewed as addressing 
moral hazard: by limiting emergency lending, that Act removes a specific, although 
contingent, circumstance that might protect a large financial firm from the consequences 
of its behavior—thereby removing that incentive for the firm to engage in risky behavior. 
That perspective is consistent, however, with speaking in terms of responsibility failure 
because moral hazard is a subset of responsibility failure.163   
 
 Finally, as in the previous examples, the limitation on emergency lending 
illustrates the utility of speaking in terms of responsibility failure, rather than 
externalities, as a type of market failure. One could discuss the emergency-lending 
                                                 
158 Dodd-Frank Act, § 1101. 
159 This article does not purport to examine whether disintermediation has been, directly 
or indirectly, a cause of that increase in size and concentration. 
160 See, e.g., Lissa Lamkin Broome, Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too 
Big To Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69 (2011) (discussing this argument). Cf. John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800 (2011) 
(observing that many economists believed that the market’s perception that some 
financial institutions were “too big to fail” resulted in an unintended subsidy for these 
institutions because their creditors charged them less for capital and this cheap capital 
resulted in an incentive to take on excessive leverage). 
161 See id. 
162 The unintended consequence of this limitation, however, may be to make financial 
firms more likely to fail, and more likely to externalize costs onto taxpayers if they do 
fail. See Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 37, at 831. 
163 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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limitation as a limitation on externalities, but speaking in terms of responsibility failure 
helps to focus attention on the actual underlying failure: that the very availability of 
governmental emergency lending can motivate firms to engage in irresponsible 
behavior.164    
 
 D. Improving Disclosure 
 
 Disintermediation can greatly increase complexity.165 That in turn can make 
financial transactions and products more difficult to disclose and understand.166 The 
Dodd-Frank Act addresses this by attempting to improve disclosure.167  
 
 In that attempt, the Act’s primary goal is the standard one: reducing information 
asymmetries between issuers of, and investors in, securities.168 To a much lesser extent, 
through its “living will” requirement, the Act also addresses the bounded rationality 
aspects of information failure.169  
 
 Because improving disclosure goes only to information failure, it does not involve 
the other two fundamental market failures—responsibility failure and agency failure.170 
 
          E. Protecting Against Insolvency and Illiquidity 
 
                                                 
164 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
165 Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 5, at 17. 
166 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
167 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, § 1103 (requiring additional public disclosures); § 942(b) 
(requiring issuers of asset-backed securities to disclose information on the assets backing 
each tranche of securities); § 945 (requiring the SEC to issue rules requiring issuers of 
asset-backed securities to disclose the nature of the underlying assets). 
168 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.   
169 Compare infra note 175 and accompanying text with Part II.A.2, supra (arguing that 
information failure results from information asymmetry and bounded rationality). 
170 The “improving disclosure” example is thus neutral to the question of comparing 
responsibility failure and externalities as market-failure categories. 
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 Dodd-Frank requires banks and, to the extent designated as “systemically 
important,” other financial firms to be subject to a range of capital and similar 
requirements.171 This indirectly (and imperfectly) goes to correcting agency failure 
insofar as it minimizes the impact on the firm of actions taken by managers that benefit 
them individually but increase risk for the firm itself.172 It also goes to correcting 
responsibility failure by mandating minimum levels of financial responsibility.173 The 
consequence is that systemically important firms should be less likely to fail, and thus 
less likely to externalize systemic costs. 
 
 This example also helps illustrate the utility of speaking in terms of responsibility 
failure; it focuses attention squarely on the problem: that some systemically important 
financial firms may be inadequately capitalized for their operations. Analytically, this is a 
more precise focus than “externalities” because undercapitalization does not necessarily 
mean that a firm will fail or that the failure will result in harm to third parties. 
 
   F. Living Wills 
 
 Addressing the possibility that even a large firm could end up failing, the Dodd-
Frank Act requires systemically important firms to submit a resolution plan—a so-called 
                                                 
171 Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 115(b), 165(i). The Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal Reserve, 
for example, to set “prudential” capital standards for certain large financial firms, 
including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1. Id., § 165(j). 
172 See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent 
Convertible Debt Requirement, NOMURA FOUNDATION, at 2–3 (April 2011), available at 
http://www.nomurafoundation.or.jp/data/20111014_R_Herring-C_Calomiris_006.pdf 
(discussing how the combination of risk-taking fostered by incentive-based pay and low 
capital requirements helped foment the financial crisis); Peter Conti-Brown, Elective 
Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 452–53 (2012) (discussing Dodd-Frank’s 
“clawback” rule that allows the SEC to recover incentive-based pay from directors and 
officers so as to make them “face the cost of their risk-taking”). Cf. Thomas F. Hellmann 
et al., Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital 
Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147, 149 (2000) (“Capital requirements 
force banks to have more of their own capital at risk so that they internalize the 
inefficiency of gambling.”).  
173 Cf. Part II.C.4, supra (discussing reducing the risk of responsibility failure by 
substantively regulating banks to minimize their risk of default). 
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“living will”—that sets forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to 
minimize any systemic impact.174 This goes to correcting all three types of market 
failures: the bounded rationality problem of information failure175 because it forces the 
firm’s managers to think through and more clearly confront the reality of the firm’s 
possible failure; agency failure (and arguably also information failure) because it 
indirectly motivates the firm’s managers to consider how they can better govern the firm 
to avoid liquidation; and responsibility failure by motivating firms to operate responsibly 
without reliance on the corporate reorganization protections of bankruptcy law. The 
consequence is that systemically important firms should be less likely to fail and, if they 
do fail, should be less likely to externalize systemic costs.  
 
 This example again helps illustrate the utility of speaking in terms of 
responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a type of market failure. Responsibility 
failure focuses attention on the fact that the corporate reorganization provisions of 
bankruptcy law may protect firms, thereby motivating them to operate irresponsibly. 
Analytically, this is a more precise focus because the protection afforded by those 
provisions does not mean that a firm will in fact operate irresponsibly or that acting 
irresponsibly will necessarily result in harm to third parties. 
 
           G. The Volcker Rule 
  
 The Dodd-Frank Act also includes procedures for limiting a systemically important 
firm’s right to make risky investments—often referred to as the Volcker Rule.176 To the 
                                                 
174 Dodd-Frank Act, § 165(d). 
175 Recall that information failure results from information asymmetry and bounded 
rationality. See Part II.A.2. 
176 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 619, § 13 (codifying steps to implement the Volcker Rule 
limiting proprietary trading). Several federal agencies—the Federal Reserve Bank, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency—have proposed rules to implement this. Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351; 17 C.F.R. pt. 255), available at 
http://fdic.gov/news/board/2011Octno6.pdf. 
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extent this limitation recognizes that even sophisticated financial firms sometimes might 
not fully understand a highly complex investment, it goes to correcting the asymmetric 
information problem of information failure. To the extent this limitation requires firms to 
restrict and be more prudent in their investments, it goes to correcting responsibility 
failure. The consequence of the limitation is that systemically important firms should be 
less likely to make risky investments that can cause them to fail, and thus less likely to 
fail (which could externalize systemic costs).177 
 
 This example, again, helps illustrate the utility of speaking in terms of 
responsibility failure, rather than externalities, as a type of market failure. Responsibility 
failure focuses attention squarely on the problem: even sophisticated financial firms can 
make imprudent investments. This invites an inquiry into how regulation should improve 
and perhaps restrict financial investing, especially for systemically important firms. But 
                                                 
177 It also may be useful to consider how focusing on information failure, agency failure, 
and responsibility failure as market-failure categories could help to explain and analyze 
the final report of the U.K. Independent Commission on Banking (often called the 
Vickers Report). The Vickers Report recommends so-called ring-fencing, which is 
intended to protect the “basic banking services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating 
secure payments systems, efficiently channelling savings to productive investments [i.e., 
making loans], and managing financial risk.” INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL 
REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011). The Vickers Report is at least partly responsive to 
disintermediation insofar as it tries to protect traditional bank intermediation from the 
risks of shadow banking. Id. at 45 (“Equally, the importance of [bank] intermediation 
means that it should not be combined with other risky activities which are not an inherent 
part of [such] intermediation.”). To the extent ring-fencing recognizes that even 
sophisticated banks might not fully understand a highly complex investment, it goes to 
correcting the asymmetric information problem of information failure. To the extent ring-
fencing requires banks to restrict and be more prudent in their investments, it goes to 
correcting responsibility failure. The consequence is that banks should be less likely to 
fail, and thus the banking system—including its ability to safeguard retail deposits, 
operate secure payments systems, make loans, and manage financial risk—should be 
more likely to remain intact. The above characterization of ring-fencing is similar to that 
of the Volcker Rule, and indeed the Volcker Rule might be considered, conceptually, as a 
subset of ring-fencing. Cf. Julian T.S. Chow & Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can the 
Volcker and Vickers Do it? (Nov. 2011) at 29, IMF Working Paper No. 11/236, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11236.pdf (comparing the Volcker 
Rule to ring-fencing proposals). Ring-fencing is nonetheless different insofar as it could 
impose regulation that goes beyond investment limitations, potentially restricting other 
business decisions of banks and systemically important firms. 
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the fact that such firms can make imprudent investments does not mean that a firm will 
necessarily do so; nor does it necessarily mean that making imprudent investments will 
cause the firm to fail, or that the firm’s failure will harm third parties. The problem, in 
other words, is connected only tenuously to the occurrence of externalities. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 By reducing the dominance of banks as financial intermediaries, disintermediation 
has so transformed the financial system that scholars—who are accustomed to speaking 
in terms of banks and bank lending—are finding it increasingly difficult to agree on 
financial regulation. Although regulation should continue to help correct information 
failure and agency failure, disintermediation amplifies systemic risk, thereby greatly 
increasing the relative importance of what scholars long have viewed as a third category 
of market failure: externalities.   
 
 In the traditional bank-intermediated financial system, viewing externalities as a 
market failure was non-controversial because prudential regulation and deposit insurance 
mitigated the externalities. The greater prominence of externalities in the 
disintermediated financial system, and the fact that prudential regulation and deposit 
insurance have little application to many so-called shadow banks that operate in that 
system, now make it essential to confront whether externalities should be viewed as a 
market failure. 
 
 This article argues that viewing externalities as a market failure can cause 
significant regulatory confusion. Conceptually, it conflates cause and effect. Externalities 
are merely consequences, not causes, of failures. Moreover, externalities cannot be a 
distinct type of market failure because all types of market failures can result in 
externalities.  
 
 Perhaps more importantly, viewing externalities as a category of market failure 
obscures who should be responsible for causing the externalities. In some cases, 
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government itself, not individual firms, effectively causes the externalities by 
promulgating laws that enable, or even require, firms to engage in risky behavior—such 
as laws that require maximizing shareholder value, and laws that limit investor liability, 
notwithstanding risk to third parties.  
 
 Viewing government as the responsible party challenges the traditional paradigm 
of market failure, which assumes away government action or inaction as a cause of 
failure.178 That challenge is critical, though. For example, we tend not to focus on 
liability limitation at the firm level, simply accepting it as a fact of life; yet, as this article 
has shown, limited liability can cause larger systemic consequences.  
 
 Any financial regulatory inquiry should include an examination of whether laws 
enable or require firms to engage in risky behavior.179 This does not necessarily mean 
that the government should change those laws or require those firms to internalize the 
costs of their behavior. That would be a political question. But that question at least 
should be asked. 
                                                 
178 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
179 Although this article is concerned with financial regulation, particularly regulation of 
the disintermediated financial system, at least one prominent economist suggests that its 
“ideas could be applicable to a variety of different situations outside of finance.” E-mail 
from John de Figueiredo, Edward and Ellen Marie Schwarzman Professor of Law and 
Professor of Strategy and Business, Duke University, to the author (Aug. 25, 2012).  
